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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jeffrey Dane Murray appeals following the district court's dismissal of his petition
for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.

He asserts that the district

court erred when it dismissed claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to
discuss with him his rights under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), and advise
him concerning whether he should waive those rights before he pled guilty and
participated in a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation, and for failing to advise
him that he could obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation before he pled
guilty and participated in a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation.

As part of

Mr. Murray's argument involves a request that this Court overruled the Idaho Court of
Appeals' decision in Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168 (Ct. App. 2011), he respectfully
requests that this Court retain his case on appeal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the criminal case from which Mr. Murray petitioned for post-conviction relief, he
entered a plea agreement with the State, assisted by his attorney Jared Martens, under
the terms of which he agreed to plead guilty to a charge of felony domestic violence
(amended from a charge of attempted strangulation) in exchange for which the State
agreed to "cap its recommendation at three plus seven, 120 days Ada County Jail, no
contact with the victim, need to get a domestic violence and alcohol evaluation," with
Mr. Murray free to argue for less, including requesting a withheld judgment to which the
State would not object based on the results of his Presentence Investigation Report
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(hereinafter, PSI) and related evaluations. As part of the agreement, Mr. Murray was

required to waive his rights under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006). (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2, p.6, L.12 - p.8, L.19.)

Mr. Murray pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea

agreement. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.18, L.19 - p.20, L.20.)
As required under the terms of his plea agreement, Mr. Murray participated in a
court-ordered domestic violence evaluation conducted by Tom Wilson.

(Plaintiff's

Exhibit 3.) During the evaluation, Mr. Murray minimized his part in the conduct for which
he pleaded guilty, denying that he acted with any ill intent. He did not express remorse,
instead "focus[ing] on the fact that he was attempting to help the victim with unknown
medical problems." And he "did not acknowledge that he is in need of treatment and is
not concerned either about his alcohol use or his risk for domestic violence." Partly as a
result of his statements to the evaluator, Mr. Wilson concluded that Mr. Murray's
"readiness for treatment is considered minimal," he represented a "medium to high risk
range for domestic violence," and "he does appear to display several characteristics of .
. . . [narcissistic personality disorder] that would increase the risk for violence," including
lacking empathy. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, pp.1-3, 9-12.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested a sentence that was in line with
the plea agreement.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.27, L.24 - p.28, L.17.)

Mr. Martens

requested that the district court "follow the agreement .... " (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.30,
Ls.13-14.)

Ultimately, the district court, after discussing the PSI and the domestic

violence evaluation, including Mr. Murray's statements to Mr. Wilson in which he
minimized his conduct, declined to follow the parties' recommendation, and imposed a
unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.31, L.2 -

p.37, L.21.) Mr. Murray did not file a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of conviction.
(R., pA.)
Mr. Murray then filed a timely verified petition for post-conviction relief. In that
petition, he raised a number of claims, only two of which are being pursued on appeal.
Those claims are that his attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him of his Estrada
rights and discuss whether he should waive those rights prior to his guilty plea and
participation in the court-ordered domestic violence evaluation, and failing to advise him
of his right to obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to deciding
whether to plead guilty. (R., pp.3-12.)
Following

an

evidentiary

hearing

at which

several

witnesses,

including

Mr. Murray and Mr. Martens, testified, the district court issued an order dismissing all of
the claims raised in his post-conviction petition.

(R., pp.93-112.)

Mr. Murray filed a

Notice of Appeal timely from the filing of the district court's order dismissing his petition
for post-conviction relief. (R., p.114.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Murray's petition for post-conviction
relief?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Murray's Petition For Post-Conviction
Relief
A.

Introduction
Mr. Murray asserts that the district court erred when it dismissed claims in his

verified petition for post-conviction relief that his attorney was ineffective for failing to
discuss with him his rights under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2006), and advise
him as to whether he should waive those rights before he entered a plea of guilty and
participated in a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation, and for failing to advise
him that he could obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to pleading
guilty.

B.

Standards Of Review
1.

Denial Of Post-Conviction Relief Following An Evidentiary Hearing

Upon review of a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when
an evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not disturb the district
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
695, 700 (1999); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App.1990). When reviewing
mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court defers to the district court's factual
findings supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of the
relevant law to those facts. Id.

2.

Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of
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counsel.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984).

Further, the

Constitution guarantees a fair trial through its Due Process Clauses, but it defines the
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685.
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the
Amendment envisions."

Id.

The "proper measure of attorney performance remains

simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id.

In light of the Sixth

Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court
has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,279 (1998).

In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also
must prove that he was prejudiced.

"The defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by
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Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000),
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different,"
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the
proceeding would have been different."

Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Murray's Claim Regarding His
Estrada Rights
In his verified petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Murray claimed that his

attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to advise him concerning his rights
under Estrada and whether to waive those rights prior to entering a plea of guilty and
participating in a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation.
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel.

The Sixth Amendment

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

The

United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to
include the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 688, 685-86 (1984). In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a petitioner must establish that his attorney's actions fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and that, but for his attorney's deficient performance, there
exists a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different.
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Murray testified that, at the time he entered his
guilty plea, he didn't know what his Estrada rights were, did not ask Mr. Martens what
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those rights were, and Mr. Martens never discussed Estrada with him.

Furthermore,

Mr. Murray believed that, following his guilty plea, his right to remain silent "was over
with when I admitted - or pled guilty to the agreeable terms." (Tr., p.18, L.3 - p.19, L.5,
p.23, Ls.9-13.)

Mr. Murray testified that he only participated in the court-ordered

domestic violence evaluation because he "was ordered [by the court] to do so," and that
Mr. Martens never gave him any advice with respect to his participation in the
evaluation. (Tr., p.24, L.20 - p.25, L.4.) Mr. Murray further testified that, although the
district court mentioned Estrada rights during his plea colloquy, he did not understand
what the district court was saying, reiterated that Mr. Martens never explained what
Estrada rights were, and that if he had known he would have ended up in prison in part
because he waived his Estrada rights he would not have pled guilty. (Tr., p.99, LS.925.)
Mr. Martens testified that he told Mr. Murray that it would be a "good idea" to
participate in the court-ordered domestic violence evaluation because "[t]rom prior
experience, it usually is." When asked whether he failed to "explain to [Mr. Murray] that
he was waiving his right against self-incrimination as to other information that might
increase his sentence," Mr. Martens testified, "I may not have. I don't remember. If he
says I didn't, I will have to take his word on that one." (Tr., p.11 0, L.22 - p.111, L.7.)
The court-ordered domestic violence evaluation resulted in a report that was
damaging and detrimental to Mr. Murray's interests. During the evaluation, Mr. Murray
minimized his part in the conduct for which he pleaded guilty, denying that he acted with
any ill intent. He did not express remorse, instead "focus[ing] on the fact that he was
attempting to help the victim with unknown medical problems."
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And he "did not

acknowledge that he is in need of treatment and is not concerned either about his
alcohol use or his risk for domestic violence." In part as a result of his statements to the
evaluator, Mr. Wilson concluded that Mr. Murray's "readiness for treatment is
considered minimal," he represented a "medium to high risk range for domestic
violence," and "he does appear to display several characteristics of that disorder
[narcissistic personality disorder] that would increase the risk for violence," including
lacking empathy. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, pp.1-3, 9-12.)
In ruling on Mr. Murray's claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to
advise him regarding his Estrada rights which prejudiced him by causing him to
participate in the damaging court-ordered domestic violence evaluation, the district court
found, "[t]here is no question that the petitioner's counsel did not advise him of his right
to remain silent at the domestic violence evaluation as required by Estrada v. State, 143
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006) nor did he discuss the consequences of waiving that
right."

(R., p.107.)

In denying the claim,1 the district court found that his attorney's

failure to provide advice regarding Estrada did not give rise to a post-conviction claim
based on the following language from the guilty plea questionnaire2 :

1 Although it did not appear to be a basis for denying Mr. Murray's claim because it was
not mentioned in the portion of the district court's order applying the facts to the law,
Mr. Murray notes that the district court made a factual finding "that the petitioner did not,
in fact, incriminate himself in uncharged criminal matters in the presentence report or
the evaluation." (R., p.102.) To the extent that the district court could be said to have
relied upon this factual finding in later dismissing this claim, Mr. Murray cites to Estrada,
in which the Supreme Court provided an expansive definition of the term incrimination,
noting that it "is implicated not just when additional charges could be filed, but also
when punishment could be enhanced as a result of the defendant's statements."
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564 (citations omitted). As such, any reliance on the factual
finding would be legally untenable.
2 The guilty plea questionnaire was admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit No.1.
(Tr., p.19,
Ls.16-17.)
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I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent
about the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial.
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of
guilty to the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under
State v. Estrada [sic]. Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even
after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any
question or to provide any information that might tend to show you
committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide
any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the
crime(s) to which you are pleading guilty.
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have
the right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with
respect to answering questions or providing information that may increase
my sentence.
(R., p.107 (quoting Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, p.1).) In reaching its conclusion, the district court

noted that, in Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168 (Ct. App. 2011),
[T]he Court of Appeals addressed the identical issue and held that, while
"it is preferable for counsel to advise a defendant of his right to remain
silent and to discuss the consequences of submitting to the evaluation,"
counsel is not ineffective for failing to re-advise his client after the trial
court has done so. Since the Court in this case did advise the petitioner of
his rights under Estrada v. State prior to any participation in a domestic
violence evaluation or a presentence report, his attorney was not required
to do so again.
(R., p.107.)

Unquestionably, Gonzales stands for the principle cited by the district court.
However, Mr. Murray maintains that Gonzales was incorrectly decided by the Idaho
Court of Appeals, especially in light of the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in
Estrada and State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). Additionally, the facts of Mr. Murray's
case can be distinguished from those in Gonzales.
In Wood, the Supreme Court considered whether an attorney in a capital murder
case provided ineffective assistance of counsel when he consented to the district court's
order releasing the contents of a then-unwritten psychological report based on a
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confidential evaluation performed by a psychiatrist retained by the defense.

In

concluding that doing so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court
explained, "[i]f a psychiatrist or psychologist had been appointed by the by the court for
purposes of a presentence investigation, counsel for Wood would have had the
opportunity to advise his client of the possible uses of the information and of the
privilege against self-incrimination." Wood, 132 Idaho at 714 (emphasis added).
In Estrada, the Supreme Court considered whether an attorney was ineffective
for failing to advise his client of his right not to incriminate himself by participating in a
psychosexual evaluation.

The questions addressed in Estrada were limited to whether

Estrada's attorney provided ineffective assistance in failing to advise him of his right to
assert the privilege against self-incrimination prior to participating in the psychosexual
evaluation and whether he was prejudiced by his attorney's deficient performance.
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 839.

In setting forth basic principles, the Court explained, "[i]t

makes no sense that a defendant would be entitled to counsel up through conviction or
entry of a guilty plea, and would also be entitled to representation at sentencing, yet
would not be entitled to the advice of counsel in the interim period regarding a
psychosexual evaluation."

Id. at 562.

The Court went on to hold that a defendant

enjoys a Sixth Amendment right "to at least the advice of counsel regarding his
participation in the psychosexual evaluation .... " Id. at 563.
A reading of the relevant portions of Wood and Estrada, discussed supra, reveals
that the effective assistance of counsel to which a person has a Sixth Amendment right
when deciding whether to participate in an evaluation is two-fold.

The first is that

defense counsel must inform the person of his right against self-incrimination.
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The

second, that went unrecognized by the Court of Appeals in Gonzales, is that defense
counsel must also provide advice regarding whether to assert that right, including
consideration of the possible uses of that information. See Wood, 132 Idaho at 714;
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 838-39 ("[N]oting that '[i]f a psychiatrist or psychologist had been

appointed by the court for purposes of a presentence investigation, counsel for Wood
would have had the opportunity to advise his client of the possible uses of the
information and of the privilege against self-incrimination."') (emphasis and brackets in
original) (quoting Wood, 132 Idaho at 714).
To hold that a district court's statements concerning a defendant's Estrada rights
are the functional equivalent of an attorney's advice on the subject, as the Court of
Appeals did in Gonzales and the district court did in this case, makes too little of the
requirement that defense counsel "advise" a defendant with respect to whether to
submit to a potentially-incriminating evaluation. As the Court in Estrada explained,
This Court's finding that a Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel
in the critical stage of a psychosexual evaluation inquiring to a defendant's
future dangerousness, does not necessarily require the presence of
counsel during the exam. Because Estrada does not argue his attorney
should have been present during the evaluation, this ruling is limited to the
finding that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding
only the decision of whether to submit to a psychosexual exam.
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562-63 (first and second emphases in original; third emphasis

added). Because Mr. Murray enjoyed a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding the
decision of whether to submit to a domestic violence evaluation, the district court erred

in concluding that its statements to Mr. Murray on the issue amounted to the equivalent
of an attorney's advice on the subject. This is particularly true in Mr. Murray's case, as
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the

district

court

provided

incorrect and

contradictory

information

concerning

Mr. Murray's Estrada rights as is discussed infra.
Factually, this case is distinguishable from Gonzales.

Gonzales,

here

the

district

court

provided

conflicting

Unlike the facts of

statements

concerning

Mr. Murray's Estrada rights, specifically stating in the guilty plea questionnaire that, by
pleading guilty, Mr. Murray was retaining his Estrada rights (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, p.1),
while, at the plea colloquy, stating,
And you understand you are giVing up your rights under State versus
Estrada [sic], and that means that you cannot refuse to answer any
question or provide any information that might tend to show you
committed some other crime?
You need to talk freely and openly with the presentence investigator and
with any domestic violence evaluator about any problems that you might
have that might have a bearing upon sentencing.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.6.)
Aside from the fact that the two pieces of information provided by the district
court contradict each other, the latter statement was incorrect. Just because Mr. Murray
entered a plea agreement containing a term that required him to participate in a
domestic violence evaluation and waive his Estrada rights does not mean that he could
not have reasserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at any time
prior to, or during, the evaluation. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966)
(recognizing that a suspect who waives his right against self-incrimination by answering
some questions or volunteering some information "does not deprive him of the right to
refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned"). While it may have constituted a breach of the
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terms of the plea agreement,3 Mr. Murray could not have irrevocably surrendered his
right against self-incrimination, a feat that could only have been accomplished through a
grant of immunity. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52
(1964) (holding that a person cannot be compelled to give incriminating testimony

unless he is granted immunity from the use of that testimony and its fruits in both state
and federal prosecutions).
For the reasons set forth supra, Mr. Murray asserts that the district court erred
when it dismissed his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with
respect to his decision to submit to a court-ordered domestic violence evaluation. He
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order dismissing his
petition on this claim, and remand this matter for entry of judgment in his favor on this
claim, with the district court to decide which of the requested remedies to employ.4

D.

The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Murray's Claim Regarding
His Right To Obtain A Confidential Domestic Violence Evaluation Prior To
Pleading Guilty
In his verified petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Murray claimed that his

attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to explain that "I had a right to obtain
my own domestic violence evaluation which would not be released to the Court without

The question that would arise in the event of a finding that Mr. Murray breached the
plea agreement would be the remedy to which the State was entitled. That is not,
however, relevant to the question of whether Mr. Murray retained the right to reassert
his privilege against self-incrimination at any time.
4 Mr. Murray sought two specific remedies: (1) withdrawal of his guilty plea, or (2)
resentencing. (R., p.11.) Either remedy is appropriate given the fact that he entered his
guilty plea without having received advice concerning his Estrada rights and whether to
assert or waive them. On appeal, Mr. Murray requests that this Court leave it to the
parties to argue, on remand, as to which remedy is appropriate.
3
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my permission," and that he was prejudiced by his attorney's deficient performance
because "[h]ad I been so informed, I would have obtained my own confidential domestic
violence evaluation prior to entering a plea of guilty." (R., p.6.)
At the evidentiary hearing on his petition, Mr. Murray testified consistently with
the statements in his verified petition, namely, that his attorney never told him that he
could have obtained his own confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to pleading
guilty, and that he "probably" would have obtained a confidential evaluation had he
known he could get one. (Tr., p.23, L.14 - p.24, L.19.)
Mr. Martens testified that he "sometimes" advises his clients of their right to
obtain confidential evaluations prior to pleading guilty, but that he did not advise
Mr. Murray of his right to obtain a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to
pleading guilty. He further testified that, at the time that Mr. Murray entered his guilty
plea, he did not know how the court-ordered domestic violence evaluation would turn
out.

However, he did know that Mr. Murray had denied some of the allegations

contained in the police reports, and believed that he would probably continue with those
denials during the domestic violence evaluation.

(Tr., p.111, L.8 - p.113, L.24.)

Mr. Martens acknowledged that the court-ordered domestic violence evaluation was
"unfavorable to Mr. Murray." The evaluation included a conclusion that Mr. Murray was
a medium-to-high risk for domestic violence, his readiness for treatment was minimal,
he tends to minimize his current and past behavior, and he doesn't believe he has
substance abuse or domestic violence problems. (Tr., p.115, L.9 - p.117, L.1.)
In dismissing this claim, the district court reasoned,
Counsel at this proceeding has also contended that it was ineffective
assistance of counsel for trial counsel not to get another domestic violence
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evaluation either before his plea for use by the defense or before
sentencing. There was no showing of any benefit from an additional
evaluation at any stage of the proceedings. It is speculative that an
additional evaluation would have been of any use. In Gonzales v. State,
supra., the Court of Appeals held that there was no obligation to obtain a
confidential defense evaluation to inform the defense decision to
participate in a court-ordered evaluation and that the failure to do so was
not ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner has failed to meet his
burden to show that his counsel was ineffective with respect to additional
evaluations.
(R., p.1 08 (failure to italicize supra and use of period after supra in original).)

Gonzales is easily distinguishable from the facts of Mr. Murray's case.

In

Gonzales, it was argued that defense counsel was ineffective for, inter alia, failing to
obtain a confidential psychosexual evaluation before advising Gonzales as to whether
he should participate in a court-ordered evaluation.

During the court-ordered

evaluation, Gonzales disclosed a number of uncharged crimes involving both the victim
of the lewd conduct charge to which he pleaded guilty (his minor daughter) and two
other victims. In rejecting this claim, the Court noted, "[c]ounsel's failure to arrange a
defense evaluation in order to prepare for the possible incriminating outcome of a
subsequent evaluation does not constitute deficient performance." Gonzales, 151 Idaho
at 173-74.
Mr. Murray has put forth a different argument, namely that his attorney was
ineffective for failing to advise him of his right to obtain a confidential domestic violence
evaluation prior to pleading guilty.

We know from the unrebutted facts established

through Mr. Murray's testimony and verified petition that he would have obtained such a
confidential evaluation had he been aware that he had the right to do so, and he would
not have pled guilty and submitted to a court-ordered evaluation had he known that
waiving his Estrada rights could have resulted in a greater sentence. (R., p.6; Tr., p.23,
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L.14 - p.24, L.19.)

Considering the damaging nature of the domestic violence

evaluation in this case, including its conclusions that Mr. Murray minimized his
culpability, was minimally ready for treatment, and did not believe that he had substance
abuse and domestic violence problems, it is reasonable to conclude that Mr. Murray
would not have pled guilty and agreed to a non-confidential domestic violence
evaluation had he known ahead of time that his evaluation would be so unfavorable.
Furthermore, in Gonzales the petitioner was aware of his ability to obtain an
independent psychosexual evaluation, as his attorney informed the court that he would
obtain such an evaluation in addition to the court-ordered evaluation at the time it was
ordered. S

Id.

The failure to advise Mr. Murray of his right to obtain a confidential

evaluation and ensure that he receive one prior to deciding to plead guilty represented
deficient performance, and prejudiced Mr. Murray by causing him to plead guilty in what
did not represent a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice.
For the reasons set forth supra, Mr. Murray asserts that the district court erred
when it dismissed his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with
respect to his attorney's failure to advise him of his right to obtain a confidential
domestic violence evaluation prior to deciding whether to plead guilty and submit to a
court-ordered domestic violence evaluation.

He respectfully requests that this Court

vacate the district court's order dismissing his petition on this claim, and remand this
matter for entry of judgment in his favor on this claim, with the district court to decide
which of the requested remedies to employ.6

5
6

Inexplicably, a separate defense evaluation was not conducted. Id. at 173.
See nA, supra.
17

CONCLUSION
Mr. Murray respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
dismissing the claims from his petition for post-conviction relief discussed herein, and
remand this matter for entry of judgment in his favor on both claims.
DATED this 9th day of August, 2012.

SPENCEH J. HAHN
Depl.1ty~State Appellate Public Defender
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